The possibility of a meeting between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen has generated considerable interest in international diplomatic circles. Such a gathering of three influential global powers could have far-reaching implications for the evolving international order. Questions surrounding the Ukraine conflict, economic sanctions, nuclear security, trade disputes and geopolitical competition could feature prominently in their discussions. However, beneath the spectacle of great-power diplomacy lies a fundamental question: can a handful of powerful nations determine the future of the world without adequately considering the interests of others?
The emerging international environment is increasingly described as multipolar. Yet, multipolarity cannot simply mean replacing the dominance of one superpower with an arrangement in which three or four powerful countries divide geopolitical influence among themselves. A genuinely multipolar world must recognise the sovereignty, strategic interests and independent decision-making capacity of nations beyond the traditional centres of power. Otherwise, the proposed international order could become another version of traditional great-power politics.
The proposed Trump-Xi-Putin engagement is significant because all three leaders represent countries with substantial military, economic and diplomatic influence. Washington seeks to maintain its international leadership while addressing economic and security challenges. Beijing wants greater geopolitical influence and protection of its economic interests. Moscow seeks to preserve its strategic position and overcome Western pressure. Their competing priorities could create opportunities for diplomatic negotiations. However, any understanding that disregards the interests of other nations risks creating new geopolitical fault lines.
Lessons From History: Why Great Power Bargains Risk Instability
History offers important lessons. The Yalta Conference of 1945, involving Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, demonstrated how decisions taken by victorious powers could shape the political future of entire regions. Although today's circumstances are substantially different, the underlying concern remains relevant: international arrangements negotiated without sufficient consideration of affected nations can generate long-term resentment and instability.
The world of 2026 is not the world of 1945. Economic interdependence is deeper, technological capabilities are more widely distributed, and emerging powers possess greater diplomatic influence. Countries such as India, Japan, Brazil, Indonesia and Australia are consequential actors in global supply chains, energy markets, maritime security and technological development. Any international arrangement that overlooks these realities risks becoming ineffective.
Why India Must Move Beyond Strategic Autonomy
For India, the proposed diplomatic engagement deserves particular attention. New Delhi has consistently advocated strategic autonomy, maintaining relationships with Washington, Moscow and other major powers while preserving independent positions on international issues. Its relationship with Russia remains important for defence cooperation and energy security, while its strategic partnership with the United States has expanded across defence technology, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and the Indo-Pacific. China, meanwhile, remains a significant strategic challenge, particularly because of unresolved border tensions and its expanding regional influence.
India must therefore move from merely articulating strategic autonomy to institutionalising it through concrete policy instruments.
Building Economic And Defence Capabilities
First, New Delhi should establish a comprehensive national economic security framework that integrates foreign policy, defence planning, trade, technology and industrial strategy. A dedicated economic security mechanism under the National Security Council Secretariat could periodically assess vulnerabilities arising from excessive dependence on individual countries for semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment, energy resources and defence components. Such assessments should identify alternative suppliers, vulnerable industrial sectors and essential strategic reserves. Economic security must become an integral component of national security rather than remain confined to trade policy.
Second, India must accelerate defence indigenisation. Strategic autonomy is difficult to sustain when essential military platforms, engines, sensors, ammunition, electronic warfare systems and advanced components depend heavily on foreign suppliers. New Delhi should establish time-bound indigenisation targets for critical defence technologies, strengthen collaboration between DRDO, public-sector defence enterprises, private manufacturers and start-ups, and expand investment in indigenous research and development. Joint ventures with foreign partners should prioritise technology transfer, domestic manufacturing, intellectual property development and Indian engineering capabilities rather than permanent dependence on imported systems. Defence exports should also become a central instrument of India's diplomatic influence.
Securing Critical Minerals And Technological Sovereignty
Third, critical-mineral security must receive the same strategic priority as energy security. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and rare-earth elements are essential for electric vehicles, renewable energy, semiconductors and advanced defence technologies. India should combine domestic exploration with overseas mineral acquisitions, long-term supply agreements and strategic partnerships across Africa, Latin America and Australia. It must simultaneously invest in domestic refining, processing, recycling and advanced-material manufacturing. Merely importing raw materials from different countries without developing processing capabilities would reproduce existing dependencies in another form.
Fourth, India must pursue technological sovereignty without embracing technological isolation. The government should create stronger incentives for indigenous semiconductor design, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cybersecurity, telecommunications and advanced manufacturing. Public procurement, research funding and industry-academia partnerships should support commercially viable Indian technologies. International technology partnerships should be negotiated around co-development, intellectual property sharing and the development of domestic engineering expertise. India's objective should be to become an indispensable contributor to global technology ecosystems rather than merely an expanding consumer market.
Strengthening India's Maritime And Regional Security
Fifth, New Delhi should strengthen its maritime and regional security architecture. The Indian Ocean remains central to India's strategic interests, connecting major energy routes, commercial shipping networks and critical maritime infrastructure. India should expand naval modernisation, maritime domain awareness, coastal surveillance and cooperation with friendly countries. The QUAD should be used more effectively for maritime security, resilient supply chains, emerging technologies and disaster response. At the same time, India should strengthen bilateral relationships with Southeast Asian countries and Indian Ocean island nations. Its neighbourhood policy must combine security cooperation with infrastructure development, connectivity, trade and capacity-building.
Seeking Greater Representation In Global Institutions
Sixth, India should demand greater representation in international decision-making institutions. Reform of the United Nations Security Council, greater participation in global financial governance and a stronger voice for developing economies must remain diplomatic priorities. India should also deepen cooperation through BRICS, the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other multilateral platforms without allowing membership in any grouping to compromise its independent foreign policy. Strategic autonomy must be accompanied by strategic participation.
Finally, India must develop a more proactive diplomatic mechanism for responding to great-power negotiations. Before and after major international summits, New Delhi should engage Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, Canberra and European capitals to communicate its red lines and identify areas of cooperation. Any arrangement affecting India's security, territorial integrity, regional stability or economic interests should be assessed independently. India must also maintain consistent diplomatic engagement with its neighbours so that external powers do not exploit regional economic and political vulnerabilities.
Multipolarity Must Respect The Sovereignty Of All Nations
These recommendations are not an argument for confrontation with any major power. They are an argument for building national capabilities that make India less vulnerable to external pressure. Strategic autonomy cannot rest on diplomatic balancing alone; it must be supported by industrial strength, military preparedness, technological innovation and economic resilience.
Ultimately, a stable international order cannot emerge from a division of influence among Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Great powers certainly have responsibilities in managing global crises, but their influence must not become a licence to determine the destinies of others. India should welcome every diplomatic initiative that reduces conflict and promotes international stability while firmly defending the principle that sovereign nations have the right to shape their own futures.
India's objective should not merely be to secure a place at the table where great powers negotiate. It should be to develop sufficient economic, military, technological and diplomatic strength to ensure that no arrangement concerning the future of Asia or the wider world can be sustained without taking India's interests seriously. That is the foundation of meaningful multipolarity.

