Imagine a scenario where confidential information that was encrypted and sent years ago is suddenly able to be decrypted. The security systems worked as intended, the information was exchanged, the encryption algorithms were considered secure and there was no evidence of a breach. However, advances in computing have made that formerly secure information vulnerable. This is a concern that is driving the discussion about quantum resistant security.

We use encryption to secure almost every aspect of our digital lives. From banking transactions and healthcare data to industrial communications and defence systems, the encryption algorithms we use to secure sensitive information have been trusted for decades. However, the rise of quantum computing is challenging our assumptions about how long certain types of security will remain effective.

While quantum computers that can crack popular public-key cryptography aren't currently available, the possibility of this is an important consideration for organisations that need to ensure long term security of data.

Understanding the threat of quantum

Cybersecurity as we know it today relies on different types of cryptography for different purposes. We use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithms to secure data. We use public-key cryptography like RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for securing key establishment, authentication and digital signatures.

Quantum computing presents different challenges to these cryptographic systems. With Shor's algorithm, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could potentially solve the mathematical problems behind RSA and ECC, thus compromising systems that rely on these cryptographic systems.

With Grover's algorithm, we have the theoretical speed up for searching for keys in symmetric encryption. For AES-256, this reduces the theoretical security margin against brute force attacks, however, this doesn't make AES-256 practically breakable with current quantum computing. This is important because we need to know what types of cryptographic systems are most at risk before we can determine what we need to change.

Another concern is that attackers could potentially collect encrypted information today, and hold on to it for decryption in the future. This approach is called harvest now, decrypt later, and it poses risks for information that must be secure for many years. Sensitive defence communications, financial data, intellectual property may remain valuable for a long time after the initial transmission.

Why existing infrastructure makes the transition difficult

While replacing an encryption algorithm may seem like a simple task, the digital infrastructure we use today consists of multiple interconnected systems with different security needs.

For example, imagine an industrial facility with hundreds of connected sensors, controllers and communication devices. Some of these devices may have been installed years ago, and may remain in use for another decade. Others may have limited processing power, memory or network connectivity.We need to consider carefully when introducing new cryptographic mechanisms to these systems.

With post-quantum cryptographic algorithms we may need larger keys, signatures, or more processing compared to current public-key cryptographic mechanisms. These differences can impact communication bandwidth, memory usage and processing performance. For real-time devices, any changes in computational requirements may impact the system design.

Thus, we need to consider the entire security architecture. This includes device authentication, key management, communication protocols and hardware compatibility. It's not just about updating software to make it quantum resistant.

What do emerging cryptographic standards mean?

We are starting to see the shift towards post-quantum cryptography. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalised three post-quantum cryptographic standards in August 2024. These are: ML-KEM for key establishment, and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for digital signatures.

These standards provide organisations with defined cryptographic mechanisms designed to resist attacks from both conventional and quantum computers. However, implementing these standards isn't just a matter of replacing cryptographic algorithms.

We need to identify vulnerable cryptography that we use, understand how encryption keys are generated and exchanged, and consider whether existing systems can support the requirements. Alternative approaches like out-of-band key distribution, and quantum key distribution are also being explored. These approaches offer different security properties, but come with practical considerations such as infrastructure, cost, scalability and interoperability.

There's no one size fits all approach that meets all operational requirements. The right architecture depends on the sensitivity of the information, devices involved and environment where communication occurs.

Building cryptographic agility into security systems

One of the most important things organisations can do to prepare is to build cryptographic agility. This involves designing systems that can adapt to changes in cryptographic algorithms and protocols without major infrastructure changes.

●      Firstly, organisations need to understand their cryptographic dependencies. What cryptographic algorithms are being used? Where are the keys being stored? How are devices authenticated? What systems may be challenging to update?

●      Secondly, prioritise. Systems protecting sensitive long-lived information, or systems in critical infrastructure may need earlier planning for migration.

Using hybrid cryptographic approaches (using both existing classical mechanisms and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms) can help in managing the transition while still being compatible during the migration process.

For connected and embedded systems, security should also be considered when designing hardware and software. Devices that are expected to be in use for many years should support secure updates and be adaptable to changing cryptographic mechanisms where technically possible.

Preparing before the threat becomes imminent

Transitioning to quantum resistant security will be a gradual process. With existing infrastructure, operational constraints and evolving standards, organisations will need to carefully plan for migration strategies.

This is especially challenging for sectors like banking, telecommunications, manufacturing and defence, where we often have sensitive information and connected infrastructure with long operational lifecycles.

We don't need quantum computing to be an imminent threat to start preparing. Information encrypted today may need to be secure for decades. Systems deployed today may be in use long after the cryptographic requirements have changed.

The focus should be on understanding our current vulnerabilities, considering emerging standards and building systems that can adapt to the changing landscape of cryptographic technology.

The future of cybersecurity will be as much about being able to update and maintain trusted security as it is about the strength of the encryption algorithms we use.

~ By Srinivas Shekar, Co-Founder and CEO, Pantherun Technologies